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Reading Copyright Cases:
The Ad Hoc Approach
by CHARLES SCHUG*
Introduction
Copyright cases need to be read in a special way. Because
the standards for determining infringement are "of necessity
vague" and must be decided on an ad hoc basis, as Judge
Learned Hand observed in one of his most famous copyright
decisions,' it is not enough merely to note the rule of law and
the appropriateness of its application to the facts of the case.
Rather, one must look in addition to circumstances and factors
that may not be clearly or plainly articulated in the opinion.
These factors include the subject matter of the suit, the per-
sonalities and backgrounds of the parties, the extent and char-
acter of the infringement complained of, the approach the
court has taken to similar cases in the past, and precedents
from other circuits. To some extent these factors demand at-
tention in all legal opinions. Without an understanding of their
importance in the area of copyright law, however, researchers
can overlook what may turn out to be the crucial or deciding
factor of the case. Decisions determined on an ad hoc basis
demand an ad hoc approach.
Therefore, in order to make full and proper use of case law,
copyright researchers must attend to two equally important el-
ements: (1) the rule of law by which the issue was decided
and (2) the reason the court ruled the way it did. It is essen-
tial to keep in mind that the second element may not coincide
with the first. It may therefore be a futile exercise to record
the "holding" of the case without noting or exploring those fac-
tors that actually persuaded the court to decide the issue the
way it did. Because copyright standards allow for so much
flexibility, consideration of the specific factual circumstances
of a case is crucial in assessing its precedential value.
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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A recent Ninth Circuit case, Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v.
Air Pirates,2 illustrates the point. The defendants, publishers
of satirical comic books, were judged to have infringed the
copyrights of various cartoon characters, among them Mickey
Mouse and Donald Duck, owned by plaintiff Walt Disney Pro-
ductions. The defendants depicted the Disney characters tak-
ing drugs, engaging in promiscuous sex, and pursuing other
nefarious activities. 3 The Air Pirates case raises at least three
important copyright issues: the copyrightability of characters,
parody as fair use,5 and the conflict between First Amendment
rights and copyright protection.6
2. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), afg 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
3. Note, Parody, Copyrights and The First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564, 571,
582 (1976).
4. That characters might not be copyrightable was suggested by the Ninth Circuit
in the "Sam Spade" case, Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). See generally Brylawski, Protection of Charac-
ters-Sam Spade Revisited, 22 COPYRIGirr BuLL. 77 (1974). The court in Air Pirates
distinguished between literary characters and cartoon characters, specifically holding
that the latter are copyrightable. 581 F.2d at 755. The court noted that cartoon charac-
ters, unlike their literary counterparts, are visually recognizable. Id. Without such
visual perceptibility, the defendant's infringing character cannot be compared with the
plaintiff's copyrighted character to test for substantial similarity, an essential element
of infringement. Brylawski, supra, at 84; Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First
Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564, 566 (1976). See generally M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 212 (1980) (hereafter NIMMER).
5. The first major case to raise parody as a fair use defense was Benny v. Loew's
Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. CBS, Inc. v.
Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), in which "Auto Light," Jack Benny's burlesque of "Gas
Light," was held to infringe the original in large part because the Benny version used
much of the original dialogue and depended on comic readings of the lines for its ef-
fect. In contrast, Sid Caesar and Imogine Coca's parody of "From Here to Eternity"
(called "From Here to Obscurity") escaped the fate of the "Auto Light" burlesque be-
cause it mimicked the original by making changes in tone, incident, and dialogue. Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955). Accord, Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally Light, Parody, Burlesque,
and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REV. 615 (1979); Note, Parody,
Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564 (1976); R.T. Nimmer, Reflec-
tions on the Problem of Parody-Infingement, 17 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp. 133 (1969); Sel-
vin, Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as Infringement, 6 COPYRIGHT BuLL.
53 (1958); Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REV.
1130 (1955).
6. Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564
(1976). See generally Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Note, The First
Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L REV. 1158; M. Nim-
mer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970). But see Note, Copyright Infringement and the
First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 320 (1979).
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Each of these legal issues must be examined carefully. Once
that task is done, however, a portion of the researcher's job re-
mains unfinished. An equally important factor to consider is
the nature and character of the infringing activity. Air Pirates'
social satire involved sexual innuendo and lewd and lascivious
behavior by the Disney characters. This kind of satire disturbs
many people, including many judges. When interjected into
copyright infringement suits, in which obscenity is not a cause
of action, the presence of sexually suggestive satire as part of
the subject matter of the suit is likely to cloud, if not confuse,
the issue. The copyright researcher should be alert to any
signs that obscenity, though not at issue, may have influenced
the court's decision.
The district court in Air Pirates discussed the nature of the
parody in that case only obliquely,' thereby indicating its sen-
sitivity in the area of sexual burlesque. The court noted, quot-
ing from the plaintiffs brief, that Disney wanted to foster "an
image of innocent delightfulness," while Air Pirates' "image
could not fairly be called innocent."' The defendants' use of
sexual satire was not mentioned thereafter. Yet it would be
foolhardy for the researcher to remain equally silent about this
factor. Further investigation reveals why: there have been
judgments for the plaintiff in nearly every recently reported
copyright infringement action involving off-color or porno-
graphic use of protected material.' Although these decisions
are all overtly based on traditional copyright standards, they
strongly suggest that works employing sexual references,
whether as parody or outright appeal to prurient interest, will
almost invariably be found to infringe plaintiff's copyrighted
work.10 In other words, a First Amendment defense or a de-
fense of parody as fair use will be difficult to sustain if "obscen-
ity" is involved, despite obvious differences in the author's
intent or the manner in which the offending material is used.
It would appear easy, for instance, to distinguish Air Pirates
from another recent case involving Disney material, Walt Dis-
7. 345 F. Supp. at 110.
8. Id.
9. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184
(5th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Walt
Disney Prod., Inc. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. See text accompanying notes 11-22 and 117-37, infra.
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ney Productions, Inc. v. Mature Pictures Corp." But the result
was the same.12 The infringement in Mature Pictures was of
"The Mickey Mouse March," the theme song from the popular
children's television show of the 1950s, "The Mickey Mouse
Club." Defendants used the song, without permission, as back-
ground music for a scene from their film, "The Life and Times
of the Happy Hooker," in which three male actors, nude except
for "Mouseketeer" hats like those worn by participants on the
television program, engaged in various sexual acts with a fe-
male actor.13 The song was repeated three times during the
scene. The court based its finding of infringement on two fac-
tors: that the song was copied in its entirety and that it was
played more than was necessary to conjure up the original to
make a satirical point (thus exceeding fair use).1 4 Defendants
argued that the song was used as a "humorous take-off"
designed to "highlight and emphasize" the transition from
childhood to manhood of the male characters. 5 Whatever the
merits of this defense, it was offered to justify a copying distin-
guishable from Air Pirates' copying of Disney characters.
The thrust of the Air Pirates' parody was social satire, a
genre that has been the stock in trade of political cartoonists
for hundreds of years." The Disney characters project an "in-
nocent delightfulness" that does not correspond to reality.
11. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
12. That the cases were decided by different circuits is not significant here. The
legal test used in Air Pirates is the same one employed by the Second Circuit in Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964): there is infringement if the
parodist uses more material from the original work than is necessary to "recall or con-
jure up" the object of the satire. Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 757;
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955). See Note, Parody,
Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 564, 572 (1976).
13. Compare District Judge Wollenberg's reticence about discussing the Air Pi-
rates' parodies with Judge Duffy's detailed description of the offending scene:
"[T]here is a portion [of the film) where three male actors sing some of the words of
the Mickey Mouse March and for a period thereafter of approximately four to five min-
utes, the Mickey Mouse March is played as background music while the female protag-
onist of the film appears to simultaneously gratify the sexual drive of the three other
actors while the group of them is located on or near a billiards table. This gratification
is apparently done orally, anally and vaginally . . .. At the time the cast on the screen
is quite bare exept that the male actors are wearing 'Mouseketeer' hats similar to those
worn by the performers in the television productions of the 'Mickey Mouse Club.'" 389
F. Supp. at 1397-98.
14. Id. at 1398. See note 5, supra.
15. Id.
16. See generally G. HIGHET, THE ANATOMY OF SATIRE (1962); R. EIorr, THE
POWER OF SATIRE (1960).
674 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
No. 41 READING COPYRIGHT CASES 675
Moreover, because the Disney worldview is a fantasy attractive
to many people, it is a remarkable commercial success. The
Disney characters are thus prime material for the kind of satire
chosen by Air Pirates-the juxtaposition of incongruous sub-
jects, the method of parody for centuries. 7 What better mate-
rial for the parodist than the contrast of "innocent
delightfulness" with the sexually liberated, drug-oriented
counterculture of the 1960s?s "The Life and Times of the
Happy Hooker," on the other hand, cannot honestly be called
satire or parody. The film's makers may have intended a comic
effect when they chose "The Mickey Mouse March" as back-
ground music, but there is otherwise no discernible satiric in-
tent.'9 The point of the Air Pirates' comics is to parody the
Disney philosophy of life; that is not the point of "The Life and
Times of the Happy Hooker."
These two cases would seem to distinguish an improper use
of parody as a defense to copyright infringement (Mature Pic-
tures) from a proper use of that defense (Air Pirates). Yet,
that is not the way they were decided. 0 Infringement was
found in both situations.
17. "Parody usually makes its point by employing a serious style to express an
incongruous subject, thus disturbing the balance of form and matter." PRINCETON EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICs 600 (Enlarged ed. 1974).
18. Cf. 'The greatest satire has been written in periods when ethical and rational
norms were sufficiently powerful to attract widespread assent, yet not so powerful as
to compel absolute conformity . . . ." Id. at 739.
19. "While defendants may have been seeking in their display of bestiality to par-
ody life, they did not parody the Mickey Mouse March but sought only to improperly
use the copyrighted material." 389 F. Supp. at 1398. This remark suggests that the
parody must be only of the object satirized to be effective as a defense against infringe-
ment. The Ninth Circuit has not followed such a requirement: it is "not fatal" that the
defendants in Air Pirates "were parodying life and society in addition to parodying the
Disney characters. Such an effect is almost an inherent aspect of any parody." 581
F.2d at 758 n.15.
20. It should be noted that the defense of parody as fair use seemed like a strong
one in the Air Pirates case. It could be argued that the harm to Walt Disney Produc-
tions from Air Pirates' use of the copyrighted characters was minimal and did not jus-
tify the limitation on freedom of speech and expression. The audience for the Air
Pirates' comics was small: only 15,000 to 20,000 copies of each issue were published.
581 F.2d at 753 n.6. By contrast, there is world-wide recognition of the Disney charac-
ters. Also, the plaintiffs audience for its publications was children, and its works were
sold in drugstores and supermarkets, while Air Pirates' comics were intended for
adults and sold in record and poster stores. Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First
Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 564, 582 (1976). The typical Disney fan, it is safe to say,
would be sorely offended by the Air Pirates burlesque, but he or she would have to be
abnormally credulous to suppose Disney Productions had anything to do with it. Con-
versely, those who enjoy that kind of parody are probably not inclined to patronize
Disney products in the first place. Further, the value in allowing social satire and criti-
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The court in Air Pirates rejected both the parody defense
and the First Amendment arguments. 21 The constitutional
consequences of the Air Pirates decision must not be lightly
weighed. In evaluating the case as a legal precedent, however,
researchers ought to note the generally unfavorable response
by most courts, including this one, to subjects that could be
considered salacious. Legal arguments alone may be insuffi-
cient to counter a judicial tendency to look unsympathetically
on defendants whose works are sexually suggestive, no matter
what their other virtues.2 2
This brief illustration should suggest the kind of approach
copyright researchers need to use generally in studying copy-
right cases. Their efforts must be tailored to meet the ad hoc
manner in which the courts themselves decide such cases. The
presence of sexually suggestive material is just one factor that
may be important. There is no easy formula whereby re-
searchers will be able quickly to determine exactly which fac-
tor tipped the scales in favor of the prevailing party. Rather,
researchers must examine each opinion separately, keeping in
mind that any one of a number of factors, or a combination of
them, may provide the clue that reveals why the case was de-
cism seems arguably greater than society's interest in protecting copyrights owned by
a corporation worth millions of dollars from insignificant harm.
21. 581 F.2d at 756-59.
22. One district court judge went so far as to accept obscenity as a defense against
infringement. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
138 (N.D. Tex. 1976). See Leverson, Copyright and Obscenity: Towards a National
Standard?, 7 PERFORMING ARTs REV. 495 (1977); Note, Copyright-The Obscenity De-
fense in Actions to Protect Copyright, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1037 (1977). The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1277
(1980). Mitchell Brothers involved an unauthorized showing of the movie, "Behind the
Green Door," a pornographic film of some notoriety. The defendants asserted in the
trial court that because the film was "obscene," it should not be given copyright protec-
tion. The appellate court rejected this argument, pointing out that while Congress has
limited copyright protection to certain classes of works, it has never restricted the sub-
ject matter of the works that fall within the enumerated categories. 604 F.2d at 854-58.
The court did not reach the question of the film's alleged obscenity. Id. at 854. The
action was brought under the Copyright Act of 1909, now superseded by 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (Supp. 111 1979), and the court limited its holding to the 1909 Act. Id. at 854
n.1. It does not seem likely, however, that the holding would be different under the
new Act. The arguments would be the same. See generally Schneider, Authority of the
Register of Copyrights to Deny Registration of a Claim to Copyright on the Ground of
Obscenity, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 691 (1975); Note, Immorality, Obscenity and the Law of
Copyright, 6 S.D.L. REV. 109 (1961).
Mitchell Brothers is interesting in that the plaintiff was seeking protection for its
sexually suggestive work. The cases cited in note 9, supra, all concerned a defendant
who used plaintiffs otherwise innocent material in a salacious manner.
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cided as it was. The discussion below includes a survey of se-
lected copyright opinions decided within the last ten years,
analyzed with an awareness of the ad hoc method of judicial
decisionmaking. The cases are chosen from the most active
circuits in this area-the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth-and
in each instance the analysis stresses ad hoc factors as well as
the rule of law.
Legal Standards For Copyright
1. Originality
The statutory requirements for copyright protection are easy
to state. The Copyright Act of 197623 sets forth seven categories
of works that are protected so long as they are "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."24
This protection includes five exclusive rights: to reproduce the
copyrighted work, to distribute it, to perform it, to display it,
and to make derivative works based on it.25 These rights are
subject to certain statutory limitations,2 6 the most general and
sweeping of which is the "fair use" doctrine.2 7
The Act does not define what is meant by "original work of
authorship"; that is determined by standards established in
case law.2 8 The Supreme Court first grappled with the ques-
tion of originality in 1884 when the copyrightability of photo-
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979). The Constitution specifically authorizes
Congress "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The seven categories listed in this section are: (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works,
including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovi-
sual works; and (7) sound recordings.
The new Act makes "fixation" the standard for statutory copyright protection, re-
placing the old "publication" standard prevailing under the Act of 1909. The new Act
defines "fixation" this way: "When its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi-
tory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Common law copyright technically still exists for "un-
fixed" works, but if the work cannot be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated in a stable form, it will be difficult to prove that the work exists, much
less that someone else has copied it.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
26. Id. §§ 108-118.
27. Id. § 107.
28. Copyright Law Revision Report of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary
(1976) at 51, quoted in 1 NIMMER, § 2.01 at p. 2-6.
graphs was challenged in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony.2 9 The defendants there argued that a photograph was
merely a reproduction and that therefore a photographer could
not be called an author.30 Pointing out that a photograph was
like an engraving or an etching, the Court suggested an "en-
larged definition" of author as someone "to whom anything
owes its origin "31 and held that photographs could be copy-
righted.3 2 Thus, "original" is defined as original to the creator
or maker.
It follows, then, that works need not be new, novel, or unique
to enjoy copyright protection.3 3 In fact, two identical works
could each be validly copyrighted if they were created inde-
pendently of one another.3 4 Even a copy of a work in the public
domain could be protected if it were a "distinguishable varia-
tion."35 All that is necessary to satisfy the requirement of origi-
nality is that the work be more than a "merely trivial"
variation.3 6 The standard is minimal. As the court said in
Hogue-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., originality in
copyright law "means little more than a prohibition of actual
copying."3
Since the requirements for originality are relatively easy to
29. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
30. Id. at 56.
31. Id. at 58. See also Jewelers' Circular Publ. Co. v. Keystone Publ. Co., 274 F. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1921).
32. 111 U.S. at 58.
33. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); 1 NIMMER, § 2.01 [A] at p. 2-7.
34. 191 F.2d at 103; Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
Scott v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 449 F. Supp. 518, 519 (D.D.C. 1978).
35. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927). It
must be added, however, that only the "variation" or original part of what would other-
wise be a copy of a work in the public domain would be protected. Dorsey v. Old
Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1938); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). Someone else
could take that same public domain work and add a distinguishable variation of his or
her own, and as long as it was not substantially similar to the first variation, that work
too could be copyrighted.
36. 191 F.2d at 103; Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
Courts at times have spoken of an "element of novelty" as the minimum requirement
for originality when variations of existing works are involved, e.g., Puddu v. Buonamici
Statuary Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971), but use of the word "novelty" can lead to
confusion with patent law and is best avoided.
37. 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. Mc-
Donald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally 1 NIMMER, § 2.01[B).
As the court said in Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d
Cir. 1970): "[T]he required creativity for copyright is modest at best."
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meet, courts have generally not invalidated copyrights for viol-
tion of that standard. However, a finding of no originality is
one way in which the court can hold for the defendant,3 8 espe-
cially when the defendant admits copying. Therefore, an alle-
gation that the plaintiffs work is not original is a commonplace
defense to an infringement action, at least where the protected
work is not a traditional subject of copyright.3 9
Under the Copyright Act, the subject matter of the work for
which protection is sought is not a factor in determining either
originality or the validity of its copyright.40 If the work falls
within one of the enumerated categories and is an original
work of authorship, statutory protection is automatic. How-
ever, certain subjects are sometimes looked upon with disfavor
by some judges, and there have been attempts to deny protec-
tion to certain kinds of subject matter. Early in this century
the Supreme Court rejected one such attempt in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co." The plaintiffs in Bleistein al-
leged infringement of the copyright of a circus advertising
brochure. Both the trial court and the appellate court found
for the defendant, on the ground that prints used for advertis-
ing were not copyrightable.Y The Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes held that the adver-
tisements were copyrightable, worthy of protection as "picto-
rial illustrations" regardless of their subject or use.43  He
observed: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
38. E.g., Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Synder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (Uncle Sam Bank);
Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971) (form for sales contract); Vogue Rings Creations v. Hardman, 410 F.
Supp. 609 (D.R.I. 1976) (finger ring).
39. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (statue lamp); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99 (1879) (accounting ledger); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir.
1977) (garden supply directory); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558
F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977) (fabric design); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675
(1st Cir. 1967) (rules for sales contest); Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313
F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1973) (educational flash cards); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beards-
ley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (insurance plan pamphlet);
R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stuffed toy);
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (printed answer sheets for machine-scored tests).
40. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1973); 41 Opp. Atty. Gen., No. 73 (Dec.
18, 1958).
41. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
42. Id. at 248.
43. Id. at 251.
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and most obvious limits."" Justice Harlan was not persuaded,
remarking that he thought constitutional protection did not ex-
tend to "a mere advertisement of a circus."
Holmes's view has prevailed, but vestiges of the Harlan posi-
tion remain, even in very recent cases.4 6 The Third Circuit's
stance on maps probably reflects a similar attitude. Maps were
among the first works to be granted copyright protection by
Congress. 47 In 1790 much of the country was unexplored and
uncharted, so that encouraging copyright protection for maps
was a necessity. By the middle of the twentieth century, when
encouragement of cartography no longer seemed so compel-
ling, some courts began to have second thoughts about protect-
ing what now appeared to be common knowledge. It was held,
for instance, that the location of county, township, and munici-
pal lines was in the public domain and not copyrightable.4 8 In-
formation divulged in government publications was also found
to be in the public domain." The original work necessary to
obtain a copyright for a map was expanded by the Third Cir-
cuit in Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc. to include a
requirement that the map maker procure some of the informa-
tion on the map "by the sweat of his own brow."50 The Amster-
dam court held that it was not sufficient that the plaintiff had
studied published maps from which he designed his own; the
kind of judgment and discretion used in such a study was not,
the court said, the type of original work required by the Copy-
right Act.51 The oddity of this ruling-that originality in maps
requires the cartographer to explore physically the area to be
44. Id.
45. Id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. For example, in a case concerning infringement of a copyrighted luggage label
used to trace lost baggage, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that as a matter of law there was no substantial similarity
between the defendant's and the plaintiff's labels. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, noting curtly, "Even a casual examination of the two labels reveals a marked
likeness." International Luggage Registry, Inc. v. Avery Products, 541 F.2d 830, 831 (9th
Cir. 1976). It seems an almost inescapable conclusion that the trial judge did not feel
that the plaintiff was entitled to protection for luggage labels. For this court, labels
were in the same category as "mere" advertisements.
47. The second session of the First Congress considered a bill to protect "maps,
charts, books, and other writings" as early as Feb. 25, 1790. COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS
1789-1904 (1905; reprinted 1976) at 120; 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
48. Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1961); Chris-
tianson v. West Publ. Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945).
49. Andrews v. Guenther Publ. Co., 60 F.2d 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).




charted-is attributable to a feeling that copyright protection
should not extend to something as readily available as knowl-
edge of, say, the streets of San Francisco. Yet, because general
copyright protection could not be denied to maps, a stricter
standard of originality was developed for maps than for other
copyrightable works, at least in the Third Circuit."
2. Infringement
All copyright suits are necessarily actions for infringement.5 3
The legal standards for infringement are as easy to state as
those for originality: there must be access plus substantial
similarity. Furthermore, the Copyright Act requires that
works be registered with the Copyright Office before an action
can be brought.5 4 Under certain circumstances, the certificate
of registration is then prima facie evidence of the validity of
the copyright." Except in cases where the defendant admits
copying and asserts a defense of fair use or the invalidity of the
copyright because it lacks originality, the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving that the defendant copied his or her work.5 6 Evi-
dence of direct copying will normally be difficult or impossible
for the plaintiff to secure. Therefore, the courts have devel-
oped a judicial standard for establishing infringement in the
absence of evidence of direct copying: the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that
there is a substantial similarity between it and the defendant's
work." The standard of proof is that of the reasonable person:
"[w]hether an ordinary lay observer would detect a substan-
tial similarity between the works.""
Stating the standard-access plus substantial similarity-is
52. See generally WHICHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: FOUR
VARIATIONS ON A LEGAL THEME (1965) at 33-68; 1 NIMMER, § 2.08[A]. The Ninth Circuit,
for one, has specifically declined to follow Amsterdam. United States v. Hamilton, 583
F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
54. Id. § 411.
55. Id. § 410(c).
56. See Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 448 F.2d 284 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974).
57. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947), is the leading case. See R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080,
1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090,
1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
58. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 863 (1975). See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fabu-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir.
1966); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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far easier than applying it. It is here that the true ad hoc. na-
ture of copyright decisions is best shown. In the majority of
cases, "similarity" is in the eye of the beholder, the "beholder"
being the judge or jury. There is often no way to demonstrate
scientifically or objectively that X is a copy of Y, because Y is
not susceptible to that kind of measure. For example, the only
way to determine if one oil painting has been copied from an-
other is to look at them side by side. Whether they will be seen
to be similar or not depends on who does the looking. The
same goes for many other copyright subjects, such as plays,
movies, and sculptures. With some, like musical compositions,
expert testimony may help to show similarity, but the ultimate
legal determination is up to the finder of fact.
The introduction of expert testimony to aid in determining
infringement has complicated copyright trials to some degree.
Some courts have distinguished between a showing of copying,
where it has been said expert testimony is appropriate, and a
showing of unlawful appropriation (that is, infringement),
where it has been held that expert testimony is inappropri-
ate." As Judge Weis of the Third Circuit observed in noting
these two kinds of substantial similarity, "While, '[r]ose is a
rose is a rose is a rose,' substantial similarity is not always sub-
stantial similarity."60
The Ninth Circuit has recently attempted to sort out the
questions involved here by establishing an extrinsic-intrinsic
test. This test is related to the dichotomy between idea, which
is not protected, and expression, which is protected. The ex-
trinsic test determines whether there is substantial similarity
in ideas. The intrinsic test determines whether the plaintiff's
expression of the idea was infringed by the defendant. Expert
testimony is appropriate for the extrinsic test, but not the in-
trinsic test."1 In part, the test is a response to the complica-
tions created by expert testimony. It remains to be seen,
however, whether this solution will help or hinder.
59. See Judge Frank's discussion in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d at 468-69. Expert
testimony may help to determine if there is any copying but the trier of fact must
determine when that copying is so substantial that it constitutes an unlawful appropri-
ation. For this latter determination, expert testimony is inappropriate.
60. 511 F.2d at 907. But see Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d
Cir. 1971).
61. Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977). Compare Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123
(2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
682 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
READING COPYRIGHT CASES
In any event, no test has yet been devised, and it is doubtful
that one can be, that will make it easier to decide how much
similarity is substantial, how little is trivial. Standards for in-
fringement are "of necessity vague"" because anything more
precise or specific would be too narrow to encompass the mul-
tifarious subjects of copyright law.
The Ad Hoc Approach
As respected as Judge Learned Hand's opinions are gener-
ally, his copyright decisions in particular have received special
recognition. His opinions in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham,6 3
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,6 4 Sheldon v. Metro-Gold-
wyn Pictures Corp.,65 and Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp." are landmark decisions frequently cited today.
In Peter Pan Fabrics, Judge Hand offered these comments,
which sum up the judicial approach to copyright cases:
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.
In the case of verbal "works" it is well settled that although the
"proprietor's" monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduc-
tion of the words, there can be no copyright in the "ideas" dis-
closed but only in their "expression." Obviously, no principle
can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying
the "idea," and has borrowed its "expression." Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc.67
In this passage Judge Hand managed, characteristically, to fo-
cus on the most salient aspects of copyright law; at the same
time he expressed a point of view that has become the corner-
stone of the courts' approach to the subject. Legal realists
would argue that all judicial decisions are ad hoc. Perhaps
that is so, but many would disagree. In the area of copyright
law, however, the ad hoc approach has been openly acknowl-
edged."
There are several reasons why the courts have adopted this
62. 274 F.2d at 489.
63. 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
64. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
65. 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
66. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
67. Id. at 489.
68. For example: "A review of copyright infringement decisions confirms the ob-
servation that most cases are decided on an ad hoc basis." Universal Athletic Sales
Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975); "Copyright infringement cases are neces-
sarily decided in an ad hoc fashion . Couleur Int'l. Ltd. v. Opulent Fabrics, Inc.,
330 F. Supp. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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approach. Most of these reasons concern the nature of the sub-
ject itself. Copyright is intangible and deals with "metaphysi-
cal" ideas, as pointed out by Joseph Story 140 years ago. 69 The
subjects covered by copyright are many and disparate, some-
times requiring idiosyncratic treatment."o The dividing line be-
tween idea and expression, an essential distinction to
copyright law, has in fact been deemed impossible to draw.
Ad hoc considerations are nearly always determinative; as
Judge Frankel observed, "Good eyes and common sense may
be as useful as deep study of reported and unreported cases,
which themselves are tied to highly particularized facts."7 2
One consequence of the dependence on common sense and
ad hoc elements is a corresponding need for flexibility in ap-
plying what few legal standards there are. Judge Hand argued
for flexibility in Peter Pan Fabrics.73 The same argument has
been made for the determination of fair use7 4 as well as for the
application of technical requirements.
In Copyright and Judges,7 Theodore R. Kupferman, Justice
of the Supreme Court of New York and a former copyright at-
torney, shed light on another aspect of the ad hoc approach.
He recounted several examples of the way in which a judge's
experience and background determined his or her approach to
an issue.7 8 For example, one federal judge, who was deaf, nev-
69. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344, No. 4901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
70. "Troublesome, too, is the fact that the same general principles are applied in
claims involving plays, novels, sculpture, maps, directories of information, musical
compositions, as well as artistic paintings. Isolating the idea from the expression and
determining the extent of copying required for unlawful appropriation necessarily de-
pend to some degree on whether the subject matter is words or symbols written on
paper, or paint brushed onto canvas." Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art
Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
71. "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." 45
F.2d at 121.
72. 330 F. Supp. at 153.
73. 274 F.2d at 489-90.
74. "The line which must be drawn between fair use and copyright infringement
depends on an examination of the facts in each case. It cannot be determined by re-
sort to any arbitrary rules or fixed criteria." Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1977).
75. "{T]he copyright laws are not to be read so technically as to create unneeded
forfeiture of otherwise valid copyrights." Dave Grossman Designs, Inc. v. Bortin, 347 F.
Supp. 1150, 1155 (E.D. Ill. 1972).
76. 19 COPYRIGHT Bu.. 343 (1972).
77. As counsel for Warner Brothers, he worked on the "Sam Spade" case. Id. at
344.
78. Id. at 350-52.
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ertheless tried musical copyright cases: he had his law clerk
play him the songs at issue on a trombone." Justice Kupfer-
man emphasized, however, that he was not criticizing judges
but pointing out a problem: "Judges cannot know everything.
They have to be educated."so
It is precisely because the ad hoc approach is acknowledged
by the courts themselves that this process of education can
take place. Justice Kupferman's call to educate judges can
only be effectively heeded if copyright researchers know what
to look for when they read the cases. They must use the ad
hoc approach in analyzing opinions in order fully to under-
stand the significance of copyright decisions.
The Ad Hoc Approach Iflustrated
The cases discussed in this section will be analyzed by the
ad hoc approach to show how the legal standards of copyright
law are most profitably considered in conjunction with ad hoc
factors. Legal standards and ad hoc factors are not separate
considerations; rather, they are intertwined elements. In a
sense, each determines the other: which legal precedents will
be applied depends upon the facts of the case, while the spe-
cific facts influence how the court will interpret and apply the
law. Because this interaction is circular in nature, an effective
analysis must not impose too artificial a separation between
them. One reason why legal analysis of copyright cases can be
difficult is that they resist easy categorization. The discussion
that follows emphasizes the sometimes subtle interactions
between ad hoc factors and legal tests, as well as traditional
legal analysis of the issues.
1. Second Circuit
Musto v. Meyer"' is an appropriate case with which to begin
the discussion because it illustrates both a common copyright
issue, the distinction between expression and idea, and the
manner in which the standards for infringement operate in a
particular factual situation. In 1968 the plaintiff published an
article in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
which he suggested that Sherlock Holmes was addicted to co-
79. Id. at 351.
80. Id. at 353.
81. 434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
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caine, that his addiction caused paranoia which resulted in his
thinking that Professor Moriarty was plotting to kill him, and
that Holmes followed Moriarty to Vienna and was treated by
Sigmund Freud for his addiction.8 2 The primary focus of the
article was a discussion of cocaine use and its effects during
the nineteenth century.83
More than five years later, defendant Nicholas Meyer pub-
lished The Seven Per Cent Solution and subsequently wrote
the screenplay for a film based on the novel. The novel pur-
ports to be a newly-discovered manuscript written by Dr. Wat-
son. In it Watson explains how Sherlock Holmes was cured of
his cocaine addiction by Sigmund Freud after Watson lured
him to Vienna by persuading Professor Moriarty to go there.
Holmes is also psychoanalyzed by Freud, who discovers that
Holmes's fear of Moriarty results from a childhood trauma: it
was Moriarty who broke the news to Holmes that Holmes's fa-
ther had murdered his mother. Holmes remains in a depres-
sion after the analysis until he becomes involved in a murder
case in Vienna, which he helps to solve.84 Both the novel and
the film were commercial successes.
Plaintiff initiated an action against Meyer, his publishers,
and the producers of the movie, claiming infringement of his
copyrighted article. Defendants moved for judgment on the
pleadings. The court treated the motion as one for summary
judgment, which it then granted." The court determined that
there was no substantial similarity between the article and the
novel and film because if anything was copied, it was only
plaintiff's idea and not his expression of it.8"
It is one of the basic principles of copyright law that ideas
cannot be copyrighted.87 That would be a violation of the First
Amendment," because freedom of speech would be impossible
if one had to pay to use ideas which others "owned" by reason
of copyright. What is copyrightable is the expression of ideas.
"Expression" goes beyond words, however, especially in refer-
ence to plays, books, or movies. As Judge Hand aptly put it in
82. Id. at 33.
83. Id. at 35.
84. Id. at 34.
85. Id. at 37.
86. Id.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
88. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.: "It is of course essential to
any protection of literary property . .. that the right cannot be
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations." 9 How much of the plot is protected,
for example, is a fine question. That question was no less diffi-
cult for the court to answer in Musto v. Meyer than it was for
Judge Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. or Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.9 0
Judge Hand spoke in Nichols of a "series of abstractions,"9'
patterns of incident and event that fit many works equally well.
He suggested that there was infringement when the plagiarist
took an abstract of the whole and used it for the infringing
work. Thus, if every incident or plot development were the
same, although names of characters and settings were
changed, there would be infringement. The defendant would
have used the plaintiff's expression of an idea. But if the de-
fendant used only a general outline or plot situation, there
would be no infringement, even though it was similar to the
plaintiff's. Only the plaintiff's idea would be used, not his or
her expression of it. This was the situation in Nichols, where
the author of "Abie's Irish Rose" sued the makers of a film in
which two young people, one Jewish, one Irish, marry despite
the conflict between their families.9 2 The opposite result was
reached in Sheldon, where the motion picture, "Letty Lyndon,"
was held to infringe a play based on the same historical events.
The court found that the sequence of details used by defend-
ant's film was the "very web" of plaintiff's "dramatic expres-
sion.""
Presented in outline form, as above, Meyer's plot certainly
resembles Musto's suggestion in his article. But the court felt
the matter was more like Nichols than Sheldon. On the facts,
however, the case did not seem clear-cut. The Nichols stan-
dard of substantial similarity could actually have led to an op-
posite result, since Meyer used the whole of what Musto said
about Holmes and Freud. At this stage of the analysis ad hoc
89. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
90. 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
91. 45 F.2d at 121.
92. "A comedy based upon conflicts between Irish and Jews, into which the mar-
riage of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright than the outline of
Romeo and Juliet." Id. at 122.
93. 81 F.2d at 55.
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factors become important in explaining more precisely why
the court reached the result it did.
There are two factors here the researcher ought to note, one
explicitly discussed by the court, the other implicit in its re-
marks. First, the plaintiff's article was written for a medical
journal and dealt primarily with the use of cocaine in the nine-
teenth century. The discussion of Holmes and Freud was
"somewhat tongue-in-cheek" 4 and served to catch the reader's
attention. Musto was writing a medical treatise, not a novel;
his objective and his audience were quite different from
Meyer's, as was the skill with which he wrote." In short, the
court implied, plaintiff had an interesting idea, but his expres-
sion of it was limited to a clever suggestion with which to begin
a medical essay. Had he written a play or short story in which
he suggested a connection between Freud and Holmes, a dif-
ferent result might have followed. The nature of the infringing
work compared to the nature of the protected work was there-
fore an important factor to which the court was explicitly call-
ing attention.
There is another factor here worth mentioning. It calls per-
haps for some speculation, but it is implicit in the court's re-
marks. It is apparent that the plaintiff did not intend to exploit
his idea for commercial entertainment; if he had, he would not
have published it in a medical journal. Moreover, in the court's
opinion, the plaintiff probably did not possess the literary skill
necessary to use his idea in a novel.9 6 He could not therefore
have expected to do what the defendant did. The conclusion
seems inescapable that the plaintiff wanted to cash in on the
defendant's success. Apart from any legal arguments in his
favor, the plaintiffs position was not a sympathetic one, and it
would be a mistake to discount such a factor.
Musto v. Meyer is a good example of the way in which legal
standards for copyright can be reinforced by ad hoc factors.
The legal result here is perfectly consistent with previous deci-
sions. It is not difficult to see that it was only an idea the de-
fendant had used, not the plaintiffs expression of it. The same
legal standard, however, is flexible enough perhaps to have
94. 434 F. Supp. at 33.
95. "Certainly there is no similarity between the article and the book as to the
objective or type of reader appeal, the fashioning of a plot, the delineation of charac-
ters, or the literary skill employed to reach the final objective." Id. at 36.
96. Id.
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permitted a judgment for the plaintiff. There was little chance
of that because, weighing all factors, including the ad hoc ones
discussed above, the court found no reason why it should hold
for the plaintiff and several reasons why it should grant sum-
mary judgment for the defendants. The ad hoc factors help the
researcher to see why that result was almost inevitable.
Another Second Circuit case reveals the other side of the
coin. In Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp.,9 7 it was the defendant who was unsympathetic and
whom the court took to task in strong language. The plaintiff
prepared and published "in-depth analytical reports"98 on cor-
porations. These reports were extensively researched and in-
cluded financial analyses and predictions. They were highly
regarded in the Wall Street community and attracted consider-
able attention when they appeared.99
The defendant was the publisher of the Wall Street Tran-
script, which ran a column of abstracts of institutional research
reports. In 1974 the defendant began regularly printing sum-
maries of the reports prepared by the plaintiff in its column.
After protesting to the defendant in vain, Wainwright sued, al-
leging copyright infringement. The defendant admitted the
copying-the abstracts were almost verbatim'oo-and raised
several defenses. In the trial court the defendant argued that
the plaintiffs copyright was invalid because its reports lacked
originality. The defendant also raised two other related de-
fenses: that its use was a "fair use" and that the First Amend-
ment allowed it to print "news" without the copyright owner's
permission.'0 ' Only these last two defenses were considered
on appeal.
The doctrine of fair use has support both in case law 0 2 and
statutory law.10 3 The Copyright Act defines it by saying pro-
tected works may be copied without permission for purposes
of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . ., scholar-
97. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), affg H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
98. 558 F.2d at 93.
99. 418 F. Supp. at 621-22.
100. 558 F.2d at 96.
101. 418 F. Supp. at 622. A fourth defense (not relevant here) was also raised.
102. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964); Dellar v. Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Wainwright was decided before the effective date of the new
Act, but the court used similar criteria. 418 F. Supp. at 625.
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ship, or research."104 The court should consider four factors in
determining fair use: the purpose of the use; the nature of the
protected work; the amount of the work copied; and the effect
of the copying on the market for or value of the work. 0 '
The trial court in Wainwright held that there was no fair use
by the defendant because it used a substantial amount of the
protected work and because other sources were available
which it could have used to reach the same conclusions as the
plaintiff. 06 The trial court also disposed of the defendant's
First Amendment defense, saying that it was indistinguishable
from the fair use defense. 07
The Circuit Court of Appeals was not so quick to dismiss the
First Amendment argument, suggesting that some day courts
may have to distinguish between fair use and First Amend-
ment limitations on copyright. 08 Nonetheless, the court held
that the First Amendment defense was inapplicable because
the defendant was not reporting the plaintiffs protected work
as news but rather was copying relevant portions for its own
financial gain.'0 9
Wainwright raises important legal issues, but there are addi-
tional facts here that ought not to be omitted from a re-
searcher's discussion of this case, especially for a client with a
potential First Amendment defense. First, it is essential to
note that Wainwright, which had been preparing financial re-
ports for forty years, 10 initially sought copyright protection for
its reports in 1976 in direct response to the defendant's contin-
uing unauthorized use of them."' In addition, suit was brought
only after the plaintiff attempted to negotiate an agreement
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
105. Id.
106. 418 F. Supp. at 625. For an example of a fair use defense that succeeded, see
Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957
(D.N.H. 1978). The defendants used 15 seconds of a song owned by the plaintiffs in a
political advertisement shown on T.V. The plaintiffs sought an injunction. The court
denied the petition on the grounds that the defendants' use was a fair use because it
did not affect sales of the record of the song and there was a strong public interest in
the dissemination of information. Id. at 961.
107. "[The tension between copyright and the First Amendment] does not exist be-
cause the doctrine of fair use . .. has been precisely contoured by the courts to assure
simultaneously the public's access to knowledge of general import and the right of an
author to protection of his intellectual creation." 418 F. Supp. at 624. See note 5, supra.
108. 558 F.2d at 95.
109. Id. at 96-97.
110. 418 F. Supp. at 621.
111. 558 F.2d at 94.
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with the defendant.1 1 2 Thus, to the court, the plaintiff probably
appeared honest and reasonable; the defendant, on the other
hand, must have seemed unreasonable and less than honest.
Although the trial court refrained from characterizing the de-
fendant or its activities when it issued a preliminary injunc-
tion, the circuit court said in rejecting the defendant's First
Amendment argument: "This was not legitimate coverage of a
news event; instead it was, and there is no other way to de-
scribe it, chiseling for personal profit." 13
The court's strong language suggests that the defendant's
First Amendment defense failed not so much because it was
considered a poor one but because the defendant's case was so
weak overall that nothing could save it. The defendant lost on
the merits, but it is useful to remember that the court was un-
sympathetic to the defendant because its activities were so
clearly self-serving. The situation was analogous to the Mature
Pictures case discussed above.'1 4 There the defendants' asser-
tion of a First Amendment defense fell on deaf ears in part be-
cause of the pornographic use to which the plaintiff's song was
put. In Wainwright the defendant's "blatantly self-serving" 15
use of the plaintiffs financial reports similarly damaged its
ability to win judgment.
Both Wainwright and Mature Pictures were probably de-
cided correctly. What is significant for the copyright re-
searcher is that the decision in Wainwright reinforces what
was said in the discussion of Air Pirates and Mature Pic-
tures."16 That is, unsympathetic defendants have a much
poorer chance of prevailing in copyright cases than sympa-
thetic ones, no matter what the merits of their cases. Such de-
fendants have a correspondingly slim hope of successfully
asserting a First Amendment defense. This defense to a copy-
right action needs to be tested in other factual situations
before its merits can be accurately assessed.
Many of the factual elements bearing on copyright decisions,
discussed thus far, appear in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,"' but with
an added twist. The plaintiff was the owner of the copyrighted
112. 418 F. Supp. at 622.
113. 558 F.2d at 96-97.
114. See text accompanying notes 11-19, supra.
115. 558 F.2d at 96.
116. See text accompanying notes 16-19, supra.
117. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" ("Bugle Boy"), first made
popular in the 1940s by the Andrews Sisters and revived by
Bette Midler in an early 1970s version.' At the height of the
latter version's popularity, the defendants wrote a musical play
entitled "Let My People Come-A Sexual Musical," which in-
cluded a song called "The Cunnilingus Champion of Co. C"
("Champion").11 Plaintiff claimed that "Champion" was cop-
ied from "Bugle Boy."
The court considered two general issues: whether the de-
fendants' song was substantially similar to the plaintiff's and
whether "Champion" was a parody or burlesque of "Bugle
Boy" and therefore subject to the fair use doctrine.12 0 Access
to the work was admitted,121 but there was considerable testi-
mony about the question of substantial similarity. The court
held that the defendants intentionally copied the plaintiffs
song 2 2 and rejected the argument that "Champion" was a par-
ody of "Bugle Boy. "123
Two points are significant in this opinion, apart from the ac-
tual legal issues. One is the court's reaction to the testimony of
the witnesses, and the other is its response after listening to
the two songs. Although a commentary on the credibility of
various witnesses is properly within a court's responsibili-
ties,124 this court appoached that task with special vigor. The
testimony of one original cast member, for example, the court
found "credible indeed on the issue of copying"; 2s at another
point, the court said, she "testified convincingly"126 in support
of the plaintiffs position. The testimony of a second cast mem-
118. Id. at 446-47.
119. Id. at 447. One of the lines from the chorus of "Bugle Boy" is: "He was some
Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B." Id. at 446 n.2.
120. Id. at 447. The court lists nine issues, but for simplicity they are reduced to two
here.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 449.
123. "Defendants may have sought to parody life, or more particularly sexual mores
and taboos, but it does not appear that they attempted to comment ludicrously upon
Bugle Boy. . . . Accordingly, we hold that Champion is not a parody or burlesque of
Bugle Boy. Champion . .. attempts to burlesque life, more particularly sexual mores.
This purpose does not justify the unwarranted use and abuse of Bugle Boy." Id. at 453.
But see Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 752, 758 n.15 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
124. 425 F. Supp. at 448 n.6.




ber it found equally "convincing."127 In addition, at one point
the court found itself "impressed to an exceptional degree by
the testimony" of the plaintiff's expert witness.128 The court
later reiterated its "very favorable reaction overall to this wit-
ness' testimony. "129
In contrast, the court gave "little credence" to one defend-
ant's testimony. 3 0 "His deportment on the stand, the many in-
consistencies adduced, compel that conclusion. We conclude
similarly with respect to our overall impression of [a second
defendant's] testimony."'' The first defendant's "lame excuse
that 95% of the 'boogie woogie' songs of which he is aware con-
tain one of the eight characteristic bass lines is as unconvinc-
ing as the rest of his testimony. "132 As for a third defendant,
the court remarked, "[tiaking this witness' testimony in toto,
we are constrained to state that, qualitatively and quantita-
tively, it did not meet the test of credence."'33 The court also
labeled his testimony "unacceptable."134
Rather obviously, if a party makes this kind of impression on
the court, it stands little chance of prevailing with any of its
arguments. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, the court's determination
that the defendants had plagiarized the plaintiff's song and
that "Champion" was not exempt from infringement as parody
was made easier by the defendants' poor showing on the stand.
When legal standards depend so heavily on ad hoc elements,
one party's making an unfavorable impression on the judge
can be a deciding factor. The same result could have followed
even if defendants were model witnesses. Alternatively, de-
fendants may have been lying (as the court strongly hinted
here), and therefore have richly merited their fate. The point
is that copyright researchers should call attention to this kind
of element so that it can be given proper consideration when
analogous situations are encountered in practice. Knowledge
of the ad hoc factors considered by the court here---defend-
ants' lack of credibility, the salacious nature of their "parody"
(an element the court never mentioned explicitly)-may be
127. Id.
128. Id. at 449.
129. Id. at 450.
130. Id. at 452.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 448-49.
133. Id. at 453.
134. Id.
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crucial in advising clients of the possible outcome of their liti-
gation.
The ultimate determination of substantial similarity be-
tween songs must be judged from the viewpoint of the ordinary
listener.1 3 5 Defendants urged the court to "listen carefully to
the recorded exhibits several times." 3 e The court's response
was instructive of its sympathies: "We have done just that;
over and over again, scores of times, we have played the An-
drews Sisters and Bette Midler versions of Bugle Boy and
Champion. Putting it bluntly, we gave what is tantamount to
microscopic attention to the totality of the evidence, particu-
larly the recordings and charts. This process has left us with
the unmistakeable impression that Champion is substantially
similar to Bugle Boy."''3 Whatever else one might conclude
from MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, it would be fair to say that it is a
good lesson on the dangers of annoying or antagonizing the
court.
These three Second Circuit cases illustrate both common le-
gal questions and ad hoc factors that are important in copy-
right opinions. Each involves the standard for infringement-
substantial similarity-but each raises questions peculiar to its
subject matter. Three disparate subjects (the exploits of a
fictional character, corporate financial reports, popular songs)
must be considered under the same rubric of "substantial simi-
larity." The application of this loose and general legal standard
is made easier, however, precisely because of its looseness:
the court is not bound to a rigid standard but is free to weigh
ad hoc factors like the plaintiff's expectations in Musto or the
defendants' blatantly self-serving behavior in Wainwright.
From the researcher's point of view, it is essential to be alert to
the sometimes covert manner in which the ad hoc factors
operate to influence judges.
2. Third Circuit
A new ad hoc factor can be discerned in the two opinions
135. See cases cited in note 58, supra.
136. 425 F. Supp. at 451.
137. Id. (emphasis in original). The court continued in the same vein: "This per-
sonal assessment, along with the solid evidence of multiple similarities offered by
plaintiff's expert, whose credibility we previously noted with approval, as well as the
testimony of the three cast members, compels us to conclude that Champion is sub-
stantially similar to Bugle Boy." Id.
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chosen from this circuit. In both Clarke v. G.A. Kayser & Sons,
Inc.13 s and Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Ex-
change, Inc.' the crucial factor was the nature of the copy-
righted work.
The Clarke decision is a relatively short Memorandum Order
explaining why the court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The dispute concerned competing ball
toss games. The plaintiff had copyrighted both a diagram of a
baseball glove and the design of the packaging in which his
game, "Stick Mitt," was sold. The diagram of the glove was
printed on a cloth to which a plastic ball covered with velcro
would stick."4 The defendants manufactured two similar
games that also included a cloth with a diagram of a baseball
glove drawn on it.' 4' The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
infringed the glove diagram and the packaging design; he also
brought an action for patent infringement.14
Finding "no need for testimony on the subject" of the copy-
right actions,143 the court examined the cloths and the pack-
ages and carefully noted their differences'" before dismissing
the two actions. The court essentially felt that one baseball
glove looked pretty much like the next and that the plaintiffs
and the defendants' diagrams resembled one another simply
because both were made to look like real baseball gloves. 4 5
The court stated succinctly the general rule: "Works which
closely duplicate conventional articles are given a narrow
scope of protection.""' Accordingly, the plaintiff received only
the protection to which he was entitled under that rule: no one
could directly copy his glove design but neither could he pre-
vent anyone from drawing his or her own picture of a baseball
glove, whether for use in a game or not.
The court gave the plaintiffs claims serious attention, but be-
138. 472 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
139. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
140. 472 F. Supp. at 483.
141. Id. The defendants' two games, which were identical, were called "Magic-
Glove" and "Catch 'Em All." Id. at 482-83.
142. Id. at 484.
143. Id. at 482.
144. Id. at 483.
145. "The similarities among the gloves arise from the fact that they all attempt to
depict an extremely common object, an actual fielder's glove worn by baseball players.





cause of the nature of the copyrighted article, it was unwilling
to offer him much protection. The court also noted that the
plaintiff did not originate the game of catch' and that similari-
ties would inevitably arise between his and others' depictions
of the game.' Although the plaintiffs copyright of his particu-
lar expression of the game of catch was allowed, it was ex-
tended limited protection. The court's application of the legal
standard of substantial similarity was shaped by this limited
protection which the plaintiffs work merited.
The issue of the copyrightability of works based on common
subjects was also explored in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National
Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc.' Albert Gilbert, a nationally rec-
ognized wildlife artist, had painted a water color called
"Cardinals on Apple Blossom," the rights to which he assigned
to National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc. (National).'s National
agreed to explore the possibility of marketing prints of Gil-
bert's works. Nothing came of this arrangement beyond the
printing of "Cardinals on Apple Blossom." Subsequently, Gil-
bert painted four water colors of birds for Franklin Mint, in-
cluding a. work called "The Cardinal,"' which National
claimed infringed the earlier painting by Gilbert.
One problem this case raised was similar to the question
posed by Clarke-what kind of copyright protection is avail-
able to copies of common items? One water color of a cardinal
is bound to look much like another water color of a cardinal,
especially since wildlife artists strive to copy nature as pre-
cisely as possible and are judged by how lifelike their drawings
are.15 2 The problem was complicated further in Franklin Mint
because the same artist painted both the plaintiffs picture and
the defendant's allegedly infringing water color.
The district court explored the matter at length, even exam-
ining a drawing of a cardinal that the artist painted in the
147. Id.
148. The more appropriate action was for the plaintiff to pursue the patent infringe-
ment claim. It appears that he was seeking protection for the idea of the game itself
and therefore a copyright action was inappropriate in the first place. See Herbert Ro-
senthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1974); Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
149. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.); cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
150. Id. at 63.
151. Id. at 64. "The Cardinal," like plaintiffs painting, depicted a male and a female




courtroom. 5 3  An important consideration was the artist's
sources. He used some of the same material (sketches, slides,
photographs) for both paintings; however, for "Cardinals on
Apple Blossom," he used stuffed birds as models, while for
"The Cardinal" he did not.15 4 The court also heard testimony
about some artists' tendency to return -to basic themes
throughout their careers. 5 5 After a minute comparison of the
two works, the trial court concluded there was no infringe-
ment.15 6 The appellate court offered an equally thorough dis-
cussion and affirmed the trial court's decision.
The court's treatment of the issues in Franklin Mint is strik-
ingly different from the discussion in Clarke, partly because
this was an appellate review but largely because the subject of
this case-a painting-is a traditionally more appropriate mat-
ter for copyright protection. The issues in Franklin Mint merit
fuller and more thorough consideration than those in Clarke
because they are more central to the philosophy behind copy-
right law. The circuit court in fact focused directly on the phil-
osophical justification for copyright in the opening paragraph
of its opinion. It quoted a passage from Lord Mansfield that
suggested that copyright law must balance the rights of au-
thors and creators to be compensated for their efforts against
society's, need for progress in the arts.s'5  The copyright re-
searcher should be aware that a court will not treat all subjects
protected by copyright in a like manner, but will consider the
nature of the copyrighted work in applying this balancing
test. 58
153. Id. at 64, 66.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 66.
156. Id. at 67.
157. Id. at 63.
158. Two cases of related interest are Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914)
and Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enterprises, 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1948), afd in part,
rev'd in part, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1950). In Gross the same photographer took two
pictures, one of which was held to infringe the other. He first photographed a nude
woman, calling the picture "Grace of Youth." 212 F. at 930. Two years later, after as-
signing the rights to that picture to the plaintiff, the photographer posed the same
model in a similar fashion, except in this picture she was smiling and had a cherry
stem in her mouth. He called this photograph "Cherry Ripe." Id. The court remarked
"some slight changes in the contours" of the model's figure, but found that "the identi-
ties are much greater than the differences" (Id. at 931) and held that "Cherry Ripe"
infringed "Grace of Youth." It seems probable that the photographer intended a par-
ody of his earlier work, but as suggested above (see text accompanying notes 11-19),
the salacious nature of the parody probably affected the result here.
In Varga the salacious nature of the protected works may have influenced the court
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3. Fifth Circuit
Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales and Service15 9 involved
the validity of a copyright of a conditional sales contract form.
The plaintiff copyrighted a paragraph-long "Agreement" for
use on standard invoice forms by which the buyer agreed that
the seller would retain title to the chattel. The plaintiff sold
standard invoice forms with his copyrighted "Agreement"
printed on them to television dealers and T.V. repair serv-
ices.16 Defendant Moore also sold business forms and began
using the plaintiff's language on its forms when a customer
brought in a copy of the "Agreement" and requested that it be
printed on its invoices.' 6 ' When defendant Zack Meyer rou-
tinely ordered invoices, Moore sent ones containing the plain-
tiff's language.16 2 The plaintiff then sued both Moore and Zack
Meyer for copyright infringement. The trial court held for the
plaintiff against Moore, but ruled that Zack Meyer was not lia-
ble since it had nothing to do with the selection of the form.16 3
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
against Moore.16 4
Since the language used by the defendants was identical to
the plaintiff's protected "Agreement," there was no question of
against the plaintiff. The defendant was an artist who specialized in drawings of par-
tially clothed women. By contract the plaintiff acquired the rights to several of these
works. After his contract terminated, the defendant began publishing calendars with
his drawings on them. The plaintiff claimed that the calendar drawings were substan-
tially similar to the ones it owned. After examining all of the drawings at issue, the
court discussed in elaborate detail the differences among them and held that there was
no infringement. The court explained: "It is apparent from the testimony that [this
kind of drawing] is all that [the defendant] has ever drawn and seems to be all he ever
will draw. It follows, therefore, that all his future drawings will bear some similarity to
his previous work, whether or not his past creations are before him at the time he is
painting. He has a certain type of art in mind and, consequently, that is all he is able to
express on the drawing board." 81 F. Supp. at 307-08. The tone of these remarks sug-
gests that the court did not value the copyrighted works very highly; their salacious
nature probably did not help the plaintiffs case.
159. 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
160. Id. at 1028.
161. Id. at 1028-29.
162. Id. at 1029.
163. Id.
164. "In this infringement suit a maker of business forms seeks copyright protec-
tion for a common legal form. The characters in this drama are O.W. Donald, the copy-
right claimant; Moore Business Forms, Inc., the alleged infringer; and Zack Meyer's
T.V. Sales and Service, the innocent bystander. Act I of this play ended when the trial
court found for Donald. We rewrite the script and reverse." Id. at 1028. For other
examples of Judge Goldberg's wit, see Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111 (5th cir. 1978);
Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
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substantial similarity. Nor was there a fair use issue, since the
plaintiff had copyrighted his "Agreement" to prevent others
from using it verbatim on invoice forms. The only way the
court could find for the defendants was to invalidate the plain-
tiff's copyright, which was precisely what it did. It held that
the "Agreement" lacked originality.16  The court noted the
similarity between the plaintiffs form and other standard legal
forms and found that the changes he made were trivial.'6 6 The
court also cited the Third Circuit's standards for maps,16 7 and
concluded: "[L]ike the map in Amsterdam, Donald's form is
nothing more than a mosaic of the existing forms, with no origi-
nal piece added." 6 s
Nimmer criticizes this case as a "questionable application"
of the idea that function is not a form of expression which is to
be given copyright protection.'6 9  Certainly the court could
have treated the plaintiffs "Agreement" in the same fashion as
the plaintiffs baseball glove diagram was treated in Clarke or
the water color of cardinals in Franklin Mint. Had it done so,
however, the result would have been a judgment for the plain-
tiff, since defendant Moore copied the "Agreement" word for
word. Just as in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 70 the court here was not
sympathetic to the plaintiff, a fact evidenced both by its assess-
ment of his testimony' 7 ' and its conclusion that "[w]e reward
creativity and originality with a copyright but we do not accord
copyright protection to a mere copycat."172  This assertion
makes it likely that ad hoc factors were determinative in this
case.
165. "In the case before us we search in vain for the requisite originality in plain-
tiff's 'Agreement.'" 426 F.2d at 1030.
166. Id. The court pointed out: "In fact it may be fairly assumed that such varia-
tions in language as did occur in plaintiffs 'Agreement' were deliberately insignificant,
for he plainly wanted a valid conditional sales contract or chattel mortgage, and valid-
ity was an attribute which the earlier forms had been proved through use to have." Id.
167. Id. at 1030-31. See text accompanying notes 47-52, supra.
168. Id. at 1031.
169. 1 NIMMER, § 2.01[B] at p. 2-14 n.35.
170. See text accompanying notes 117-37, supra.
171. "Plaintiff, a non-lawyer who stated that he studied law for approximately one
year, has denied that he used these prior works in preparing the 'Agreement.' How-
ever, considering the technical difficulties involved in drafting such form, plaintiffs
limited legal education, and his obvious access to and knowledge of these forms from
his uncompleted legal studies, we have no doubt that plaintiff either consciously or
unconsciously availed himself of these prior works while drafting the 'Agreement."'
426 F.2d at 1029.
172. Id. at 1031.
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In Moore v. Lighthouse Publishing Co., 7 3 a combination of ad
hoc factors operated to persuade the court to grant the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs alleged that
a map of Old Savannah published by the defendant infringed
the copyrighted map appearing in their tourist guide, Savan-
nah's Sights & Sounds. 1 7 Both maps depicted the streets and
squares of the city, including landmark buildings, forts, resorts
and major highways. 7 1 One defense witness, a commercial art
student, testified that the map in the defendant's publication,
The Savannahian, was his sole creation. 7 6 However, the
plaintiffs presented evidence that both maps contained some
of the same inaccuracies and errors,177 and they demonstrated
that when the maps were brought to scale and overlaid on one
another, they coincided.17 8
On these facts alone, it would seem probable that judgment
would be rendered for the plaintiffs. There were two additional
factors, however, that prevented that result. First, the plain-
tiffs' map was itself based on a third map drawn by the same
cartographer. Second, because the copyrighted item was a
map (rather than an illustration, photograph, or painting) and
this court chose to follow the Third Circuit's standard for maps,
the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that their map was
original. At this point the plaintiffs' case ran aground. They
had first sought permission from Ladyprint Shop, a graphic
arts store, to use a map it had copyrighted. Ladyprint declined
to allow direct use of this map, but referred them to its cartog-
rapher. For compensation paid to him and to Ladyprint, he
prepared a map for the plaintiffs.17
The court examined all three maps, found them to be sub-
stantially similar, and so invalidated the plaintiffs' map for lack
of originality.8 0 Ladyprint's map, from which it was copied,
might have met the test of originality but the plaintiffs did not
have standing to sue for infringement of it. (Ladyprint was not
a party to this action.) As the court said of the plaintiffs:
"They are in the ambivalent position of asserting that the de-
173. 429 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ga. 1977).
174. Id. at 1306.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1307.
177. Id. at 1307-08.
178. Id. at 1311.
179. Id. at 1307.
180. Id. at 1311.
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fendant has infringed on what they themselves took from a
work copyrighted by a third party." 1s
Although the court did not say so, the fact that the plaintiffs
and the defendant were business rivals-both published
guides to the city-could have affected the decision, especially
since the plaintiffs, in the court's opinion, appeared to be trying
to obtain exclusive rights to information in the public do-
main.182
It is not clear why someone could not have a valid copyright
on a map with symbols or small sketches depicting historic
buildings, but this court seemed uncomfortable with such an
idea.'s In fact, the court seemed uncomfortable with the
whole subject. After reviewing the relevant case law, the court
remarked: "One emerges from this jungle of generality, con-
tradiction and uncertainty with the impression that the only
thing certain in this area of law is the lack of it.""' The court's
unfamiliarity with copyright law, as Justice Kupferman sug-
gests,185 can be a vital factor in determining the outcome of the
litigation.
4. Ninth Circuit
A case that raises some of the same issues as Lighthouse
Publishing, but reaches a contrary result, is the recent Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Hamilton.'8 6 This was a crimi-
nal prosecution in which the defendant, who admitted copying
181. Id.
182. "The unique plan of streets and squares in downtown Savannah is a physical
fact. So are the churches, houses, forts, etc., in and near the city. They belong to the
public domain. If plaintiffs are correct that the highly simplified representations on
their map containing drawings of that type used to depict certain landmarks and struc-
tures are copyrightable, no one can publish, except at peril, a guide map in which that
device is used." Id. at 1310-11. The court says here that it is the device by which
landmarks are represented that is not copyrightable, but the context suggests the
court felt that even things connected with matters in the public domain ought not to be
given copyright protection.
183. "The streets, squares and various historic landmarks in 'Old Savannah' cannot
be exclusively appropriated. Nor can one acquire an exclusive right to identify by
symbolic drawings buildings, forts and points of interest." Id. at 1310. This comment
misses the point, since one would not acquire the exclusive right to the idea of identi-
fying these places by symbolic drawings; one would, rather, have the exclusive right
only to the particular drawings themselves, that is, to the expressions of the idea of so
representing landmarks.
184. Id. at 1309.
185. See text accompanying notes 76-80, supra.
186. 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978).
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a protected map, was convicted in the district court of knowing
and willful infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 104 and was
fined $700.00.117 He appealed, alleging the invalidity of the
map's copyright because of lack of originality.' 8 The circuit
court affirmed his conviction.189
The defendant had made and sold reproductions of a county
map copyrighted by KDB Enterprises in 1973. That map was
based on a map of Ada County, Idaho, produced and copy-
righted by KDB in 1970.190 The defendant argued that the 1973
map lacked originality because it was just a synthesis of what
had already appeared on maps in the public domain.' There
was evidence presented to show that certain terrain features of
the 1973 map, including rifle ranges, motorcycle and jeep trails,
landmarks, and landing strips, were derived in part from the
observations of a KDB employee.'9 2 It was unclear, however,
whether this employee's efforts contributed more than a trivial
amount to the map's making.19 3 The court found that the 1973
map was valid and ruled that "selection, design, and synthesis"
were elements of authorship that would sustain a map's origi-
nality.19 4
In so holding, the court specifically rejected the Third Cir-
cuit's map standard announced in Amsterdam v. Triangle Pub-
lications, Inc.195 In order for the copyright of a map to be valid
under Amsterdam, the cartographer must do "some original
work, get more than an infinitesimal amount of original infor-
mation," by physically going out and gathering it.' The Ham-
ilton court cogently argued that the Amsterdam rule was
theoretically unsound because it established a different stan-
dard for maps despite the fact that expression in cartography
is the same as expression in other protected areas that also
187. Id. at 449.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 452.
190. Id. at 449.
191. Id. at 449-50.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 450.
194. Id. at 452. "We rule that elements of compilation which amount to more than a
matter of trivial selection may, either alone or when taken into consideration with di-
rect observation, support a finding that a map is sufficiently original to merit copyright
protection." Id.
195. 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951). See text accompanying notes 47-52, supra.
196. Id. at 106.
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make use of material in the public domain.1 7 Amsterdam sub-
stituted proof of direct observation for proof of distinguishable
variation,' but, as the Hamilton court noted, the direct obser-
vation rule has not made it easier to show originality in
maps.199
The danger of the Amsterdam rule is that some people will
feel that they can reproduce and sell copyrighted maps with
impunity if they think that the cartographer is not likely to
have surveyed personally an area already well mapped. How
many map makers would choose to walk or drive the length
and breadth of Manhattan in order to produce a street map of
it? Such a procedure would be senseless, but unless they
could show they had made such a foray, the map they designed
by using other maps would be denied protection under the Am-
sterdam rule.
There is no indication in Hamilton why this case arose as a
criminal prosecution rather than a civil action, but the court
could not have been unmindful of the possibility of continued
willful infringement had it adopted the Third Circuit rule. That
danger would have continued even if it had found sufficient
originality under Amsterdam to uphold the validity of KDB's
copyright while still sustaining Hamilton's conviction.
Thus, in Hamilton, two ad hoc factors, the willful nature of
the infringement and dissatisfaction with the Amsterdam hold-
ing, contributed to the court's rejection of the legal standard
required to show the originality of maps followed by several
other circuits.
Conclusion
Judge Learned Hand correctly assessed the way in which
copyright cases are decided when he said that decisions must
inevitably be ad hoc.2 0 0 Factors such as the kind of item copy-
righted (Clarke v. G.A. Kayser & Sons, Inc.,2 01 Franklin Mint
Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc .202), the credibil-
ity of the defendants (MCA, Inc. v. Wilson 203 ), the justness of
197. 583 F.2d at 451. See text accompanying notes 34-38, supra.
198. See note 35, supra.
199. 583 F.2d at 451.
200. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
201. See text accompanying notes 140-48, supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 149-58, supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 117-37, supra.
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the plaintiffs claim (Musto v. Meyer"o'), the judge's back-
ground and experience in the field (Moore v. Lighthouse Pub-
lishing Co. 205 ), the self-serving nature of the infringement
(Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,20 6
United States v. Hamilton2 07 ), the salaciousness of the infring-
ing use (Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Air PirateS208)-all
these and other kinds of ad hoc factors play a crucial part in
the way copyright cases are decided. They work hand in glove
with the general and broadly stated legal tests which apply to
copyrights. The legal standards are necessarily vague to ac-
commodate the varied subject matter to which copyright pro-
tection is extended. The "metaphysical" nature of copyright
also mandates flexibility if equitable results are to be achieved.
There are major drawbacks to an ad hoc approach by the
courts, principally lack of uniformity and unpredictability.
These drawbacks are mitigated in the area of copyright, how-
ever, precisely because the courts as well as the parties recog-
nize that exact legal standards cannot be formulated. By and
large, this is as it should be. You can't legislate perception:
two things either look the same or they don't. Since the stan-
dard for infringement is what the ordinary lay observer would
see as being substantially similar,2 0 9 a court is as good a judge
as anyone. In short, a more precisely defined legal test would
not help the trier of fact decide whether one rock song sounds
like another or this sculpture looks like that one.
In addition, the flexibility inherent in copyright law makes it
relatively easy for a court to avoid following bad law. A similar
factual situation may not be present, the court may decline to
follow the holding, or an incorrect decision may be circum-
vented by distinguishing the facts of the case at bar from those
of the prior case. For example, a district court in the Fifth Cir-
cuit that wanted to uphold the validity of a copyrighted legal
form could find that the form in question was a substantial va-
riation; Donald v. Zack Meyer's2 1 0 would not cause such a de-
termination to be reversed on appeal.211 Because most
204. See text accompanying notes 81-96, supra.
205. See text accompanying notes 173-85, supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 97-115, supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 186-98, supra.
208. See text accompanying notes 2-22, supra.
209. See text accompanying notes 55-58, supra.
210. See text accompanying notes 159-72, supra.
211. It would be more difficult for a district court judge in the Third Circuit to up-
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copyright decisions are based on findings of fact, appellate
courts do not reverse frequently.
It is easy to see, then, that a straightforward and traditional
legal analysis of a copyright case might give rise to a mislead-
ing impression about its precedential value if it did not also
examine the ad hoc factors involved. For example, a recent
commentator 212 announced with some alarm that the Second
Circuit was introducing the novelty standard of patents into
copyright law because of its decision in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v.
Snyder.2 1 3 In Batlin the court invalidated the copyright of a
plastic "Uncle Sam" bank, a product of the Bicentennial souve-
nir craze, on the grounds that it lacked originality. It had been
copied from a bank in the public domain, and although the
plaintiff's bank was reduced in size and cast in plastic instead
of metal, the court held there was no distinguishable varia-
tion.2 14 It appears that the court felt that the plaintiff should
not be able to have a copyright on something as traditionally
American as "Uncle Sam."2 15 The case has not in fact changed
the Second Circuit's stated standards for copyright.
A weighing of the ad hoc factors in Batlin would have helped
put its holding in perspective. Essentially, this is the real les-
son of the ad hoc approach to copyright cases. An ad hoc read-
ing allows researchers to understand how and why a particular
case was decided the way it was. Armed with that knowledge,
they can more accurately assess the meaning and impact of
each decision. Although copyright cases will never be as pre-
dictable as, say, many tax cases, an ad hoc analysis at least
allows the researcher to make an educated guess about their
outcome.
hold the copyright of a map unless there was at least some evidence of physical labor
by the cartographer. If there were even a modicum of physical effort a court would be
free to find that it was not trivial. On the other hand, the Amsterdam rule is popular
with those courts that are already inclined not to allow much copyright protection to
maps.
212. Note, Copyright-Originality--Confusing the Standards for Granting Copy-
rights and Patents, 79 W. VA. L. REV. 410 (1977).
213. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976), affg 394 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
214. Id. at 492.
215. "To extend copyrightability," the court remarked, "to minuscule variations
would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent
on appropriating and monopolizing public domain works." Id.
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